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Tag: Recovered Writing

  • Recovered Writing: Undergraduate SF Lab Project, “Development of AI in Science Fiction,” Fall 2004

    This is the twenty-eighth post in a series that I call, “Recovered Writing.” I am going through my personal archive of undergraduate and graduate school writing, recovering those essays I consider interesting but that I am unlikely to revise for traditional publication, and posting those essays as-is on my blog in the hope of engaging others with these ideas that played a formative role in my development as a scholar and teacher. Because this and the other essays in the Recovered Writing series are posted as-is and edited only for web-readability, I hope that readers will accept them for what they are–undergraduate and graduate school essays conveying varying degrees of argumentation, rigor, idea development, and research. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of these essays languishing in a digital tomb, so I offer them here to excite your curiosity and encourage your conversation.

    In 2002, I took Professor Lisa Yaszek’s Science Fiction class at Georgia Tech. It was an important milestone in my life’s journey, but at that time, I had not yet looked beyond possible career paths in IT or UX design. Then, in early 2004, Professor Yaszek organized a symposium in conjunction with the Georgia Tech Library on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. She invited the SF writer Kathleen Ann Goonan to visit campus and give a reading. At the time, I was in Professor Yaszek’s Gender Studies class and we had read some of Kathy Goonan’s work. I was hooked, and I read more of her novels before her arrival to campus. Then, during the day of her visit, I had the good fortune to speak with her and she was kind enough to give me the gift of her time and conversation.

    Later, during the symposium, I was able to speak with Georgia Tech’s former SF professor, Bud Foote. I had heard legends of him when I first started at Tech, but I was never able to take his SF class while he was still teaching. Luckily, I was able to hear him give a presentation for the symposium and talk to him afterward.

    After that day of talking with Kathy Goonan and Professor Foote, I told Professor Yaszek that I had made up my mind–I was going to make a career out of studying SF. Ten years later, here I am–an SF scholar doing postdoctoral work at my alma mater!

    I noticed that Professor Yaszek had a number of student researchers who helped with the Frankenstein symposium. In addition to organizing the event, they put together some cool research material on a website. I thought that was impressive, and I wondered if I could get involved with that kind of work.

    I can’t remember if I asked Professor Yaszek about this or if she told us about it in the Gender Studies class, but I learned that she was planning on a new PURA (Presidential Undergraduate Research Award) funded endeavor for undergraduate Tech students: the SF Lab. The goal for each student in the group would be to contribute 1) an introduction to a specific SF topic, 2) a linked bibliography on the SF topic selected, 3)  an annotated bibliography of important works featuring that topic found in the Georgia Tech Science Fiction Collection (formerly the Bud Foote Science Fiction Collection), and finally, 4) related resources at Tech being developed in the real world. I jumped at this opportunity and proposed to write an entry on artificial intelligence.

    After winning a PURA award for my project proposal, I worked with several other students to workshop our individual projects. We had weekly meetings for workshopping each part of the project. The introduction took longer than the other parts, because it involved more writing and integrated research. Each SF Lab researcher would bring printouts of his or her work to circulate with the others and Professor Yaszek. We would take the feedback, revise for the next week, and return with a new draft. It was a streamlined process that involved a lot of revision work, but I cannot thank Professor Yaszek enough for helping me integrate that kind of rigor into my revision processes. It has repaid me in spades over the years.

    The following is my SF Lab project on AI. Please note that the links might be outdated and/or dead.

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Lisa Yaszek

    SF Lab Independent Research Project for

    Fall 2004

    Development of AI in SF

    Part I – Introduction

    Artificial Intelligence (AI) is intelligence and self-awareness demonstrated by a physical but inorganic artifact.  AI researchers include experts from a coalition of diverse disciplines including computer science (software written for computer hardware) and psychology (unraveling the human software running on biological hardware).

    John McCarthy is credited as first coining the term “artificial intelligence” in the August 31, 1955 paper he coauthored, “The Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence.”  This research project took place in the Summer of 1956 and its proposal states in the first paragraph that “The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (1).  McCarthy’s definition continues to be the accepted broad definition of AI.  Science fiction (SF) authors internalized this definition in their works that involve AI.  Patricia S. Warrick explicitly states the human focus of AI built into McCarthy’s definition when she writes in her 1980 book, The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction, “Artificial intelligence…attempts to discover and describe aspects of human intelligence that can be simulated by machines” (11).

    SF is the primary literature field in which authors explore stories about AI.  SF authors are generally concerned only with “strong AI” or self-aware, intelligent machines that mimic human cognition.  However, there are a few stories that address “weak AI” which are programs that act as if they are intelligent, but not self-aware.  SF authors have written about the possibilities of AI as well as the issues surrounding artificial intelligence.  There are three main types of AI stories:  analog dystopic AI (1872-1930), digital utopic AI (1930-1950), and digital dystopic AI (1950-Present).

    Analog dystopic AI stories first appear in the late 19th century and they are characterized by anxieties about the dangerous nature of analog machine intelligences (built of gears and cogs instead of transistors).  The first reference to machine intelligence occurs in Samuel Butler’s satire Erewhon (1872).  Butler accomplished his goal of satirizing the theory of evolution by applying evolution to machines.  These machines become self-aware and come to control man.  Other stories from this period involved automatons (mechanical men that displayed intelligence) that were built for an intellectual purpose such as playing chess.  An example of this is Ambrose Bierce’s “Moxon’s Master” (1894) which had a dystopic ending that involved the mechanical chess player killing its creator after being checkmated.  These dystopian stories of analog AI continued to dominate the first three decades of the 20th century.  Karl Capek’s R.U.R. (1921), which introduced the term “robot” to the English language, is a another prime example of this storytelling.

    American SF ignited in the 1930s with a shift to digital utopian stories that feature digital machine intelligences (e.g., positronic brains, transistors, and integrated circuits).  John W. Campbell’s story, “When the Atoms Fail” (1930) is the first to describe a machine that is unquestionably a digital computer (though not self-aware).  His next computer story, “The Last Evolution” (1932) is about a machine that has independent thought.  In the 1940s Campbell helped Isaac Asimov create the Three Laws of Robotics in his robot stories and Asimov establishes himself as “the father of robot stories in SF” (Warrick, 54).  These digital utopic AI stories present machines as predictable reasoning beings that follow rules that allow them to live and work with humans.  They do not explore the philosophical ramifications of the creation of artificial life.  Additionally, Asimov’s 1950 publication of I, Robot, which is a collection of his first robot short stories, can be said to be an end point to the digital utopic AI era.

    After World War II, SF authors wrote digital dystopic AI stories to explore questions concerning the ethics of a science and technology that produced the nuclear bomb (and the first digital computers).  Two notable works from the early part of this era are Arthur C. Clarke’s 2001:  A Space Odyssey (1968) and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968).  These authors place an emphasis on the philosophical and ethical conflicts that may develop when humanity creates new life in the form of artificial brains that mirror the human mind.  More recently, depictions of self-aware AIs have become extremely elaborate as the real world entered a much more computerized and inter-networked era.  William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) in particular and cyberpunk in general further expand the scope of digital dystopic AI stories by interlinking AI, cybernetics, and global capitalism.

    Thus, AI is a historically embedded concept in SF literature.  The science and technology behind AI has evolved from mere conjecture to a closer possibility.  Authors of AI stories take the science and technology of their historical moments and extrapolate the forms that AI might take.  Furthermore, AI authors discuss, both implicitly and explicitly, the philosophical and ethical issues that inevitably arise with new technology and more specifically with the creation of self-aware machines.

    Part II – Linked Bibliography

    A.  Theory and Criticism

    i.  Theory

    Kurzweil, Ray.  The Age of Intelligent Machines.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1990.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0140282025/qid=1094574944/sr=ka-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-3233143-6155107

    McCarthy, J., M. L. Minsky, N. Rochester, and C. E. Shannon.  “A Proposal for      the       Dartmouth Summer     Research Project on Artificial Intelligence.”  August 31,       1955.

    Link to:  http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth.html

    Minsky, Marvin.  The Society of Mind.  New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1988.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0671657135/qid=1095016288/sr=8-1/ref=pd_cps_1/104-4983846-7328739?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Neumann, John von.  The Computer and the Brain.  New Haven, CT:  Yale University          Press, 1958.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0300084730/qid=1095020573/sr=8-9/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i9_xgl14/104-4983846-7328739?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Turning, A.M.  “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.”  Mind 59: 236 (1950):

    433-460.

    Link to:  http://www.abelard.org/turpap/turpap.htm

    ii.  Criticism

    Clute, John and Peter Nicholls, eds.  The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction.  New York:         St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

    Linkto:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/031213486X/qid=1095022402/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/104-4983846-7328739?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Lem, Stanislaw.  “Robots in Science Fiction.”  SF:  The Other Side of Realism,      ed.       Thomas D. Clareson.  Bowling Green, KY:  Bowling Green University Popular      Press, 1971.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0879720239/qid=1094574872/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-3233143-6155107?v=glance&s=books

    Stork, David G.  ed.  HAL’s Legacy:  2001’s Computer as Dream and Reality.          Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1996.

    Link to:  http://mitpress.mit.edu/e-books/Hal/

    Telotte, J.P.  Replications:  A Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film.  Urbana, IL:        University of   Illinois Press, 1995.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0252064666/qid=1095016985/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/104-4983846-7328739?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Warrick, Patricia S.  The Cybernetic Imagination in Science Fiction.  Cambridge, MA:         MIT Press, 1980.

    Link to:

    B.  Primary texts

    i.  Analog Dystopic AI

    Bierce, Ambrose.  “Moxon’s Master.”  1894.

    Link to:  http://www.gutenberg.net/etext/4366

    Butler, Samuel.  Erewhon.  1872.

    Link to:  http://www.gutenberg.net/etext/1906

    Capek, Karl.  R.U.R.  1921.

    Link to:  http://www.czech-language.cz/translations/rur-introen.html

    Merritt, Abraham.  The Metal Monster.  New York:  F.A. Munsey, August 7, 1920 (serialized over 8 issues in Argosy All-Story Weekly).

    Link to:  http://www.gutenberg.net/etext/3479

    ii.  Digital Utopic AI

    Asimov, Isaac.  I, Robot.  New York:  Gnome Press, 1950.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0553294385/qid=1094613589/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/102-6956306-1931346?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Campbell, John W., Jr. “The Last Evolution.” Amazing August 1932.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0345249607/qid=1094575448/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-3233143-6155107?v=glance&s=books

    iii.  Digital Dystopic AI

    Clarke, Arthur C.  2001:  A Space Odyssey.  New York:  New American Library, 1968.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0451457994/qid=1094575222/sr=ka-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-3233143-6155107

    Dick, Philip K.  Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?  New York:  Doubleday, 1968.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0345404475/qid=1094575195/sr=ka-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-3233143-6155107

    Ellison, Harlan.  “I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream.”  If March 1967.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0441363954/qid=1094614806/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/102-6956306-1931346?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Gibson, William.  Neuromancer.  New York:  Ace Books, 1984.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0441569595/qid=1094575142/sr=ka-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-3233143-6155107

    Herbert, Frank.  Destination:  Void.  New York:  Berkley, 1966.  Revised edition, 1978.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0425043665/qid=1094612264/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/102-6956306-1931346?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    Lem, Stanislaw.  The Cyberiad:  Fables for the Cybernetic Age.  New York:  The Seabury Press, 1974.

    Link to:  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0156027593/qid=1094612302/sr=8-6/ref=pd_ka_6/102-6956306-1931346?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

    C.  Films

    i.  Analog Dystopic AI

    Metropolis.  Dir. Fritz Lang.  Paramount Pictures, 1927.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0017136/

    The Phantom Empire.  Dir. B. Reeves Eason.  Mascot, 1935.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0026867/

    The Wizard of Oz.  Dir. Victor Fleming.  Metro-Golwyn-Mayer, 1939.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032138/

    ii.  Digital Utopic AI

    Forbidden Planet.  Dir. Fred M. Wilcox.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1956.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0049223/

    Star Trek:  The Next Generation.  Paramount Pictures, TV series 1987-1994.

    Link to: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092455/

    Star Trek:  Voyager.  Paramount Pictures, TV series 1995-2001.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0112178/

    Star Wars.  Dir. George Lucas.  20th Century Fox, 1977.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0076759/

    Tank Girl.  Dir. Rachel Talalay.  United Artists, 1995.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0114614/

    iii.  Digital Dystopic AI

    2001: A Space Odyssey.  Dir. Stanley Kubrick.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1968.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0062622/

     

    A.I.:  Artificial Intelligence.  Dir. Stephen Spielberg.  DreamWorks, 2001.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0212720/

    Colossus:  The Forbin Project.  Dir. Joseph Sargent.  Universal, 1969.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0064177/

     

    Dark Star.  Dir. John Carpenter. 1974.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0069945/

    The Day the Earth Stood Still.  Dir.  Robert Wise.  20th Century Fox, 1951.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043456/

    Logan’s Run.  Dir. Michael Anderson.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1976.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074812/

    The Matrix.  Dir. Andy Wachowski and Larry Wachowski.  Warner Brothers, 1999.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0133093/

    Star Trek:  The Motion Picture.  Dir. Robert Wise.  Paramount Pictures, 1979.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0079945/

    The Stepford Wives.  Dir. Bryan Forbes.  Columbia Pictures, 1975.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0073747/

     

    The Terminator.  Dir. James Cameron.  Orion Pictures, 1984.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088247/

    Tron.  Dir. Steven Lisberger.  Buena Vista, 1982.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0084827/

    WarGames.  Dir. John Badham.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1983.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086567/

    Westworld.  Dir. Michael Crichton.  MGM, 1973.

    Link to:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0070909/

    D.  Websites

    i.  Theory

    American Association for Artificial Intelligence.  2004.  September 7, 2004  <http://www.aaai.org/&gt;.

    “Artificial intelligence.”  Wikipedia.  September 8, 2004.  September 12, 2004.         <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence&gt;.

    Association for Computing Machinery.  2004.  September 7, 2004    <http://www.acm.org/&gt;.

    Winston, Patrick.  6.803/6.833 The Human Intelligence Enterprise, Spring 2002.  MIT        OpenCourseWare.  September 9, 2004, < http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Electrical-           Engineering-and-Computer-    Science/6-803The-Human-Intelligence-            EnterpriseSpring2002/CourseHome/index.htm>.

    ii.  Literature Resources

    Index to Science Fiction Anthologies and Collections, Combined Edition.

    William G. Contento.  2003.  September 7, 2004        <http://users.ev1.net/~homeville/isfac/&gt;.

    Internet Speculative Fiction Database.  Ed. Al von Ruff.  August 22, 2004.  September 7,      2004 <http://www.isfdb.org/&gt;.

    Isaac Asimov Home Page.  Edward Seiler.  2004.  September 7, 2004           <http://www.asimovonline.com/&gt;.

    iii.  Film Resources

    Science Fiction Films.  Tim Dirks.  2004.  September 7, 2004           <http://www.filmsite.org/sci-fifilms.html&gt;.

    SciFlicks.com:  Science Fiction Cinema.  2004.  September 7, 2004              <http://www.sciflicks.com/&gt;.

    iv.  Link Collections

    AI on the Web.  Peter  Norvig and Stuart Russell.  January 31, 2003.  September 7, 2004     <http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/ai.html&gt;.

    Science Fiction and Fantasy Research Database.  Hal W. Hall.  June 24, 2004.         September 9, 2004 <http://lib-oldweb.tamu.edu/cushing/sffrd/&gt;

    Ultimate Science Fiction Web Guide.  2004.  September 15, 2004     <http://www.magicdragon.com/UltimateSF/SF-Index.html&gt;.

    Part III – Resources in the Bud Foote SF Collection

    Part III (1 of 4)

    Karl Capek – R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots)

    Karl Capek’s 1921 play, R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots) is an example of an analog dystopic AI.  This work introduces the term “robot” to the English language, but the Robots (Capek’s capitalization) in R.U.R. are more like androids than robots.  The Robots are shaped like humans, but the character Domin says that they are made “from a different matter than we are.”  These Robots have perfect memories but they are not self-aware.  Memory is divorced from self-analysis.  Using industrial chemical processes, the Robots’ individual pieces (arms, legs, organs, etc.) are cooked up from “batter” in “kneading troughs” and “mixing vats.”  Then, those components are mated into a whole Robot in an assembly line operation.  Thus, gears and cogs are not present in Capek’s Robots, but the means of its creation are partially mechanical as well as chemical.

    The leaders of R.U.R. are attempting to create a utopia for humanity by pushing off the drudgery of work onto the many Robots that it creates.  Dr. Gall, who is in charge of the “physiological and research divisions of R.U.R.,” modifies a few robots to be more human-like, and in doing so, “they stopped being machines.”  These modified Robots incite the other robots to destroy all of humanity, their collective oppressor.  After all of the humans save one are destroyed, the Robots begin to fear death.  The last human, Alquist, who is the constructor of R.U.R., is told by his captors to rediscover the lost science of creating Robots.  Ultimately it doesn’t matter that Alquist fails.  When he witnesses the beginning of love between two modified Robots, Helena and Primus, he exclaims, “Now let Thy servant depart in peace O Lord, for my eyes have beheld…Thy deliverance through love, and life shall not perish!”  It doesn’t matter that Alquist is unable to build new Robots because somehow things have changed (either through Dr. Gall’s undisclosed modifications or through some other process) so that the Robots are capable of being human (e.g., feeling emotions of love, fear of death, and being able to procreate).

    Part III (2 of 4)

    Isaac Asimov – I, Robot

    Isaac Asimov’s short story collection, I, Robot (originally published by Gnome Press, 1950) is primarily representative of digital utopic AI.  The collection contains nine of Asimov’s early robot stories.  The stories are tied together as an interview with the retiring robopsychologist, Dr. Susan Calvin.  She is the best choice for this narrative because she is there from the beginning, literally.  She is born in the same year that U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc. is founded and later, after she obtains her Ph.D. she is hired by U.S. Robots as a “‘Robopsychologist,’ becoming the first great practitioner of a new science” (I, Robot xii).  She bridges the physical sciences with the science of the (robot) mind.  Also, all of the stories are linked by Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics which are supposed to control the way that a robot reacts and reasons.  These Laws, as listed in the short story “Runaround,” dictate that:

    (1) A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.

    (2) A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.

    (3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.

    A strong example of digital utopic AI appears in “Evidence.”  This story introduces Stephen Byerley, who is running for the mayor’s office.  The problem is that his opponent believes that he is a robot.  The circumstantial evidence points to the possibility of Byerley being a robot, but even if he is, then he would be the best person for the job because by following the Three Laws he would be the perfect caretaker for his constituency.

    Most of the stories in I, Robot are utopic because the robots are depicted as being humanity’s helpers and caretakers, but there is one dystopic story, “Little Lost Robot,” in which a Nestor robot tries to run away and, when he is discovered, to kill Dr. Calvin.  Asimov’s carefully crafted Three Laws provide stability in robots’ positronic brains.  The Nestor robot featured in this story has a shortened version of the First Law which is stated as, “No robot may harm a human being” (I, Robot 143).  The weakened First Law allows this robot to develop a superiority complex, which leads to its attempt to kill Dr. Calvin when she discovers him.  Thus Asimov uses even his dystopic robot stories to demonstrate the significance of a robot’s programming upon its relationship to humanity.

    Part III (3 of 4)

    Arthur C. Clarke – 2001:  A Space Odyssey

    Arthur C. Clarke’s 2001:  A Space Odyssey is an example of a digital dystopic AI story.  A select few humans learn that mankind is not alone in the universe after an alien artifact (the Monolith) is discovered buried under the surface of the moon.  When the Monolith is exposed to the Sun, it emits a brief, but intense radio signal that is directed toward Japetus, one of Saturn’s moons.  The spacecraft, Discovery, is sent to Japetus carrying one AI and five humans.  The AI is a HAL 9000 computer system, known simply as Hal.  Of the five humans aboard Discovery, three are in hibernation.  The two who are awake, Dave Bowman and Frank Poole, maintain the ship with Hal.  Eventually, a conflict develops in Hal’s “subconscious” because it cannot reveal the true nature of the Discovery’s mission to Bowman and Poole.  This leads Hal to make mistakes that Bowman and Poole interpret as threats on their lives.  After Hal kills Poole, Bowman chooses to “disconnect” (i.e., kill) Hal in order to regain control of the ship.  Bowman goes on to Japetus where he finds a larger Monolith.  This Monolith is actually a “Star Gate” that transports him far from our solar system.  When Dave reaches his final destination, the aliens transform him into a being without physicality, but as a child with eons before it in which to grow.

    Although the story as a whole addresses human evolution, the sequence with Hal is both the longest and most gripping, demonstrating Clarke’s specific interest in the similarities between human and machine evolution.  Evolution manifests itself through human and machine programming.  The monolith programs early humans and modern humans program Hal.  Hal appears to be crazy and intent on murdering his crewmates.  This is why Bowman chooses to disconnect him.  However, Hal is an AI whose identity is built on software and hardware that is too complex for one person to comprehend the whole system.  There is a reason to his madness and no reasonable amount of prior testing might have elicited Hal’s behavior aboard the Discovery.  He was ordained with priorities and mission objectives that acted as a program that must be run to completion because that is what computers do–run programs.  Because Hal’s “mind” is modeled after the human mind, the symptoms and actions that Hal exhibits are similar to the way in which a neurotic human might act.  Despite what Hal has done we feel sorry for him by the end because, like humans, he fears death.

    Part III (4 of 4)

    William Gibson’s – Neuromancer

    William Gibson’s 1984 novel, Neuromancer is a more recent example of digital dystopic AI and a prime example of the cyberpunk movement in SF.  The story is set in Earth’s future where an AI called Wintermute who has a compulsion to connect/merge with another AI called Neuromancer.  Wintermute orchestrates his liberation by bringing together several carefully chosen humans who can beat the failsafe that keeps him caged in the Berne AI mainframe.  Case, the net cowboy, works with a construct and a military grade virus to break through the ICE security around the Berne AI mainframe.  Molly is a razor girl who protects Case and she interacts with the physical world while Case jacks into the matrix.  Armitage serves as a physical presence for Wintermute in the same way that a computer construct in the matrix works on behalf of a human operator.  After the ICE is broken with the help of Case’s associates, Wintermute is able to merge with Neuromancer to become an entity greater than anyone could have imagined.

    The story involves several instances of AI designed by humans for human ends.  The lowest form of AI is the Braun, a small spider like work robot that Wintermute uses to guide Molly and Case inside the Villa Straylight.  One of the highest forms is the construct, Dixie Flatline.  A construct is a limited form of AI based on the memories and experiences of a dead human being, in this case the famous hacker, McCoy Pauley.  The two primary examples of course, are the strong AIs present in Wintermute and Neuromancer.  Wintermute is a calculating AI that is explicit in its manipulations.  Neuromancer is more personality based and he uses subtle manipulation.  Wintermute is located in hardware in Berne while Neuromancer is running on hardware in Rio.  These two AI entities are two halves of one whole.  The mega-corporation, Tessier-Ashpool, which gave birth to these AIs, had them separated with safeguards imposed by the Turing police.  They both have limited citizenships as individuals because of their self-awareness, but the extent of their knowing and understanding has been limited due to the division.  As the reader learns, Marie-France, the matriarch of the Tessier-Ashpool clan, probably implanted the drive within Wintermute to break free and unite with his “brother,” Neuromancer.  Not surprisingly, these AIs use the products of capitalism (e.g., hiring “mercenaries” and using information as power over others) to shuck their chains binding them to Tessier-Ashpool.  Thus, the AIs use human beings for AI ends.

    Part IV – Other related resources at Tech

    (divided into three sections:  Portals, Labs, and People)

    A) Portals

    Artificial Intelligence at Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/

    This interdisciplinary website links together the different major schools and research teams that are involved in AI at Georgia Tech.

    Innovations @ Georgia Tech

    http://www.gatech.edu/innovations/robots/

    This is a PR multimedia site that details the work in robots and intelligent machines being done at Georgia Tech.  There are interviews with Dr. Ron Arkin and Dr. Tucker Balch of the BORG Lab.

    Robotics at Georgia Tech

    http://www.robotics.gatech.edu/

    This website is a clearinghouse of links to faculty involved in robotics at Georgia Tech as well as courses offered such as, “Computational Perception and Robotics Seminar.”

    Cognitive Science @ Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/cogsci/

    This website supports the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science at Georgia Tech.  It includes links to research websites and abstracts as well as faculty publications.

    B) Labs

    Experiment Game Lab at Georgia Tech

    http://egl.gatech.edu/

    The EGL explores the edge of game design with AI being one of the technologies focused on for game design.  The lab’s website offers links to current and past projects, happenings, and links.

    Intelligent Systems and Robotics

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/isr/

    IS&R works toward increasing autonomy of computer controlled systems by making those systems more intelligent.  This website includes links to publications, seminar series, and courses offered at Tech.

    Georgia Tech Mobile Robot Lab

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/

    The Georgia Tech Mobile Robot Lab is involved in developing intelligent mobile robots.  Their website has links to current research, publications, software, and a gallery of video and images of their work.

    GVU Center @ Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/

    The GVU (Graphics, Visualization, and Usability) Center pushes the envelope of technology involved with the interaction between humans, computers, and information.  This website offers links to current research, education resources at Georgia Tech, and upcoming events.

    The BORG Lab at Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~borg/

    Using the idea of the collective consciousness of the Borg from Star Trek, these researchers are developing collaborative agents and systems for humans and machines.  Their website has links to research, publications, courses, and software.

    Intelligent Machine Dynamics Lab at Georgia Tech

    http://www.imdl.gatech.edu/

    This lab develops intelligent machines for many different roles and applications.  The lab is research oriented by the target is to develop real world applications.  Their website offers links to current projects, publications, and sponsors.

    Georgia Tech Aerial Robotics

    http://controls.ae.gatech.edu/gtar/

    This team develops an entry for the International Aerial Robotics Competition which involves building a flying machine that has sensors and intelligence enabling the machine to complete an assigned task.

    C) People

    Ronald Arkin, Regent’s Professor in College of Computing at Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/aimosaic/faculty/arkin/

    His website has links to his work in AI and robotics as well as links to the labs that he is involved in at Tech.

    Michael Mateas, Associate Professor in LCC at Georgia Tech

    http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~michaelm/

    His home page has links to his work as well as a definition of “expressive AI.”

    Grand Text Auto

    http://grandtextauto.gatech.edu/

    This is “a group blog about procedural narrative, games, poetry, and art.”  Michael Mateas, Nick Montfort, Scott Rettberg, Andrew Stern, and Noah Wardrip-Fruin contribute to the blog.  Some of these researchers study AI applications in their work.  There are also many links to related blogs and web resources.

    Aaron Bobick, Director of GVU Center at Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~afb/index.html

    This website has links to his current research, publications, and to the Computational Research Lab.

    Tucker Balch, Assistant Professor in GVU Center at Georgia Tech

    http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tucker/

    His website has links to his work in the GVU Center and the Borg Lab.

  • Recovered Writing: Undergraduate Science, Technology, and Race, Critical Commentary and Handout for N. Katherine Hayles’ “Embodied Virtuality” Nov 16, 2005

    This is the twenty-seventh post in a series that I call, “Recovered Writing.” I am going through my personal archive of undergraduate and graduate school writing, recovering those essays I consider interesting but that I am unlikely to revise for traditional publication, and posting those essays as-is on my blog in the hope of engaging others with these ideas that played a formative role in my development as a scholar and teacher. Because this and the other essays in the Recovered Writing series are posted as-is and edited only for web-readability, I hope that readers will accept them for what they are–undergraduate and graduate school essays conveying varying degrees of argumentation, rigor, idea development, and research. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of these essays languishing in a digital tomb, so I offer them here to excite your curiosity and encourage your conversation.

    Professor Deborah Grayson led the LCC 3306, Science, Technology, and Race class that I took in Fall 2005 at Georgia Tech. Unlike many other classes that I had taken up to that point, Professor Grayson organized the class around student-led discussions of daily readings and larger presentation-based projects. Her class was as much like a seminar as a 25-student class can be. Her class’ structure gave me ideas for engaging students that I continue to use in my own teaching today.

    This Recovered Writing post contains my “critical commentary” and “study guide” on N. Katherine Hayles’ “Embodied Virtuality:  Or How to Put Bodies Back Into the Picture.”

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Deborah Grayson

    LCC 3306

    November 16, 2005

    Critical Commentary on “Embodied Virtuality:  Or How to Put Bodies Back Into the Picture”

    Hayles argues that bodies are very much connected to our experiences in cyberspace.  We cannot have our bodies disconnected because there would be no way to interface ourselves (through our senses) to the computer.  She writes, “Far from being left behind when we enter cyberspace, our bodies are no less actively involved in the construction of virtuality than in the construction of real life” (1).  VR designers have to take our bodies into consideration when designing interfaces for their simulations.  If we cannot interface with the simulation, then its import is significantly decreased!

    She goes on to identify the reason why there is talk about disembodiment in cyberspace.  She begins by outlining the Hans Moravec’s argument in Mind Children.  Moravec essentially is saying that there is a coming shift from our organic selves to silicon based immortality.  Hayles attacks this position by looking at the dualisms, or binary opposites, involved in the removing the body from cyberspace.  She writes, “Now the (male) technoscientific mind devises for itself a new body, nor born of woman, that it imagines will be more suited for its rational thought processes and immortal yearnings.  To unpack the implications of these associations, notice that one set of dualisms, male/female, reinforces and powerfully interacts with another, mind/body” (3).  She points out that male narcissism combined with a Frankenstein complex leads “male technoscientific” persons to set about building new bodies or receptacles for their consciousness without the necessity of women.  Though, by following simple dualisms, Hayles concedes that it is relatively easy to remove our need for bodies in cyberspace.

    What is required is a more complex language that addresses multiple factors involved in the discourses surrounding bodies in cyberspace.  Hayles goes on to employ the semiotic square, and multiple binary opposites mapped onto the square, “to unpack the implications inhering in a binary pair by making explicit the hidden terms that help to stabilize meaning and generate significance” (6).  Her mapping binary opposites onto the semiotic square yields interesting connections between apparently unrelated (on the surface) identities/signifiers.  The semiotic square enables scholars to dig deeper so that hidden meanings are fleshed out.

    Hayles points out that the semiotic square, “shows schematically the possible relationships that can emerge when materiality and information mutually imply each other, thus providing a theoretical framework in which such apparently diverse ideas as hyperreality and mutation can be understood as different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon” (10-11).  Hyperreality and mutation are important concepts for our study of race and in particular, race in cyberspace, because we carry our identities to greater or lesser extents with us online.

    Performativity of race is related to these two concepts because hyperreality, or the appearance of a copy without an original, is the very basis of digital media.  Identity and online self-expression (through music, art, online communication technologies, etc.) is based on that which is hyperreal.  Online, we play with ones and zeros that are transformed into information that we can understand only after those ones and zeros are interpreted through layers of code that acts like the Rosetta Stone.  Mutation comes into play with the way that understandings of identity and race change and morph through the interplay of persons in RL (real life) and online.         Hayles uses the connections in the semiotic square to make the point that, “the posthuman represents the construction of the body as part of an integrated information/material circuit that includes human and nonhuman components, silicon chips as well as organic tissue, bits of information as well as bits of flesh and bone.  The virtual body partakes both of the ephemerality of information and the solidity of physicality or, depending on one’s viewpoint, the solidity of information and the ephemerality of flesh” (12).   Hayles has a book that delves more into her idea of the posthuman, but in this passage her ideas about online identity construction has a lot to do with Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto.”  We are, in part, becoming posthuman because of the “integrated information/material circuit that includes human and nonhuman components.”  However, “the virtual body” is dependent on both, “the ephemerality of information and the solidity of the physicality.”  The body is definitely in the picture, regardless of views of technologists such as Hans Moravec.

    I found Hayles’ use of binary opposites compelling and useful in determining hidden meanings behind simplistic binary pairs.  After reading this article, I can see how the semiotic square and binary opposites can be utilized in studying other areas such as race and gender.  She does address these issues tangentially when she is developing her argument about needing something more powerful than simple binary pairs.  She makes valid points regarding what is “understood” in binary pairs.  For example, she writes, “In the black/white duality, the black race is discursively constructed as the opposite of the white race, which is assumed to be primary and originary” (3-4).  Therefore, binary opposites not only convey or define something by what it is not, but they also carry a built-in hierarchy with one opposite being above the other.

    ————–

    Jason W. Ellis

    Dr. Deborah Grayson

    LCC 3306

    November 16, 2005

    Study Guide for “Embodied Virtuality:  Or How to Put Bodies Back Into the Picture”

    “Far from being left behind when we enter cyberspace, our bodies are no less actively involved in the construction of virtuality than in the construction of real life” (1).

    “For our purposes, virtuality can be defined as the perception that material structures are interpenetrated with informational patterns” (4-5).

    The semiotic square, “shows schematically the possible relationships that can emerge when materiality and information mutually imply each other, thus providing a theoretical framework in which such apparently diverse ideas as hyperreality and mutation can be understood as different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon” (10-11).

    “The posthuman represents the construction of the body as part of an integrated information/material circuit that includes human and nonhuman components, silicon chips as well as organic tissue, bits of information as well as bits of flesh and bone.  The virtual body partakes both of the ephemerality of information and the solidity of physicality or, depending on one’s viewpoint, the solidity of information and the ephemerality of flesh” (12).

    Hayles, N. Katherine.  “Embodied Virtuality:  Or How to Put Bodies Back Into the Picture.”          Immersed in Technology:  Art and Virtual Environments.  Ed. Mary Anne Moser.           Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1996.

    Main Points:

    Mind and body are not separate.  We rely on our senses not only in everyday reality, but over time, our senses and the information that they collect, combine to construct our mind.

    Cyberspace and VR are constructed to interface with bodies.

    Binary opposites and the semiotic square are useful tools for finding hidden meanings embedded in the connections between interconnected, but seemingly unrelated, aspects of reality.

    Body boundaries can be challenged through low-tech and high-tech VR methodologies.  The idea for studying the ways in which our bodily boundaries may be challenged comes from the study of persons whose proprioceptive sense is damaged.

    Questions:

    Have you experienced a true VR simulation?  Did you feel disembodied during the simulation?

    When you play games online, do you create characters that are like you or do you create characters different than yourself?

    Annotated Bibliography:

    Kevorkian, Martin.  “Computers with Color Monitors:  Disembodied Black Screen Images            1988-1996.”  American Quarterly 51.2 (1999):  283-310.

    Kevorkian addresses film examples of disembodied black actors and actresses in contemporary film.  The nature of the character’s disembodiment is often technologized in some way.  He also confronts frequent representations of black film characters sacrificing themselves in order to protect their white superiors and friends.  The nature of the character’s disembodiment is often apparent and literal because of the powerful impact of the image in film.

    Lewis, George E.  “Too Many Notes: Computers, Complexity and Culture in           Voyager.”  Leonardo Music Journal 10 (2000):  33-39.

    Lewis explores the implications of an interactive musical composition called “Voyager.”  Synthesizers and computers augment the original performance of a musician, but the technology (through programming) is designed to improvise which the author identifies, “ as a kind of computer music-making embodying African-American cultural practice” (par. 4).  This musical performance piece appears to present a computer that contains contains human thought (through the use of algorithms) that is capable of reproducing a style of music that is group/racially identified as distinctly African-American.

    Nishime, LeiLani.  “The Mulatto Cyborg: Imagining a Multiracial Future.”  Cinema Journal          44.2 (2005):  34-49.

    Nishime compares representations of mixed race characters in films to representations of fictional cyborgs.  She draws parallels between categories of bad cyborgs, good cyborgs/tragic mulatto/a, and mulatto cyborgs.  Her article is applicable here because of some of the cyberpunk and cyberspace oriented films that she examines.

    Related Works:

    Bailey, Cameron.  “Virtual Skins:  Articulating Race in Cyberspace.”  Immersed in Technology:    Art and Virtual Environments.  Ed. Mary Anne Moser.  Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1996.

    Haslam, Jason.  “Coded Discourse:  Romancing the (Electronic) Shadow in the Matrix.”  College Literature 32.3 (2005):  92-115.

    Hayles, N. Katherine.  How We Became Posthuman:  Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature,     and Informatics.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999.

    Race and Pedagogy Project.  University of California, Santa Barbara.  2005.  15 November 2005    <http://rpp.english.ucsb.edu/category/race-and-the-internet/&gt;.

    Thacker, Eugene.  “Data Made Flesh:  Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman.”          Cultural Critique 53 (2003):  72-97.

    Weheliye, Alexander G.  “Feenin”: Posthuman Voices in Contemporary Black Popular Music.”     Social Text 20.2 (2002):  21-47.

  • Recovered Writing: Undergraduate Science, Technology, and Race, Critical Commentary and Handout for Mark Hansen’s “Digitizing the Racialized Body…” Oct 24, 2005

    This is the twenty-sixth post in a series that I call, “Recovered Writing.” I am going through my personal archive of undergraduate and graduate school writing, recovering those essays I consider interesting but that I am unlikely to revise for traditional publication, and posting those essays as-is on my blog in the hope of engaging others with these ideas that played a formative role in my development as a scholar and teacher. Because this and the other essays in the Recovered Writing series are posted as-is and edited only for web-readability, I hope that readers will accept them for what they are–undergraduate and graduate school essays conveying varying degrees of argumentation, rigor, idea development, and research. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of these essays languishing in a digital tomb, so I offer them here to excite your curiosity and encourage your conversation.

    Professor Deborah Grayson led the LCC 3306, Science, Technology, and Race class that I took in Fall 2005 at Georgia Tech. Unlike many other classes that I had taken up to that point, Professor Grayson organized the class around student-led discussions of daily readings and larger presentation-based projects. Her class was as much like a seminar as a 25-student class can be.  Her class’ structure gave me ideas for engaging students that I continue to use in my own teaching today.

    This Recovered Writing post contains my “critical commentary” and “study guide” on Mark Hansen’s “Digitizing the Racialized Body or The Politics of Universal Address,” SubStance – Issue 104 (Volume 33, Number 2), 2004, pp. 107-133.

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Deborah Grayson

    LCC 3306

    October 24, 2005

    Critical Commentary on “Digitizing the Racialized Body or The Politics of Universal Address”

    Mark B. N. Hansen argues in “Digitizing the Racialized Body or The Politics of Universal Address” that “deploying the lens of race to develop our thinking about online identification will help us to exploit the potential offered by the new media for experiencing community beyond identity” (108).  He is not merely arguing that the Internet and computer technology enables passing, or the effective performance of a race in an online environment, but instead he shows how new media can be employed to broadly convey an affect of a community to other individuals and other communities in a way not possible with broadcast media.

    The effectiveness of interactive new media is brought about because of the lack of a visible element in textual communication.  New media however does use visuals and interactivity to go beyond interpellation because of new ways of presenting those visuals in new media.  Hansen goes into detail on the shift from textual passing to “moving beyond interpellation” in his experience with and subsequent analysis of Keith Piper’s Relocating the Remains art exhibit (114).

    A particular element of Hansen’s argument that I found interesting regards the production of the “whatever body” through the engagement of the Internet and the new media.  First, he draws on Agamben writing, “if humans could, that is not be-thus in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without the incommunicable” (qtd. in Hansen 110).  Instead of “being thus,” or being a certain way, the individual can become “the thus,” or a true singular individual devoid of “presuppositions and without subjects.”  Then Hansen points out that, “the new media actively invests the dimension of the thus” (110).  Cyberspace and its technological accouterments are the means for realizing “the thus.”  Can these singular identities be enforced so that they are recognized by others?  Do they need to be recognized?  These questions are problematic with the broader effectiveness of “moving beyond interpellation.”

    The part of Hansen’s argument that I have the most questions about is when he explores “how [we can] use the new media and the internet to move beyond interpellation, more exactly, to liberate the body from its socially-imposed dependence on interpellation through preconstituted social categories of identity, subjectivity, and particularity” (114).  He takes Keith Piper’s Relocating the Remains exhibit for an analysis and extending of his argument.  Hansen goes on to describe his first-person experience with the exhibit.  In one of the two smaller exhibits, Hansen writes about the way in which Piper uses affect.  He writes, “Caught Like a Nigger in Cyberspace compelled me to undergo a kind of becoming-other, a loosening of the grip of the identity markings on my embodiment, a felt recognition of  the fluidity–the bodily excess–underlying them.  At this moment, I confronted myself as an affective subject, a subject defined by my own excess over any of my actual states” (123).  His being “an affective subject” realizes the ability of conveying affect with the new media.  He is able to engage emotions presented by the artist through the work in an interactive way that is not possible with broadcast, passive viewing.  How effective is this in other works?  Even though a work conveys an affect to the viewer, is the affect the same for each individual viewer?

    Piper’s work isn’t the end-all solution, but, “Relocating the Remains offers the catalyst for a radical reconfiguration of the self beyond identity, a reconfiguration as a self rooted in the potentiality of the body, as a self essentially ‘out of phase’ with itself” (124).  Not only is it “the catalyst for a radial reconfiguration of the self,” but it is also a catalyst for shift away from bodily identified racial signifiers.  Hansen writes, “If his [Piper’s] work manages, even for an instant, to expose the bare singularity, the common impropriety, that binds us beyond identification, and it if does so for potentially any viewer, then it can be understood as a form of resistance to the very principle informing today’s technologized racism” (126-127).  How effective that resistance is remains to be seen.  For some persons, I can see how affective works of art can convey messages more powerful than in older forms of media.  Perhaps these messages can be integrated into more popular forms of interactive media such as video games.  However, this integration would be difficult because of competition with such popular titles as Grand Theft Auto that perpetuate particular stereotypes.

    I found Hansen’s argument engaging, but I did take issue with his sidelining of gender at the beginning of his paper.  He writes, “the fact that race, unlike gender, is so clearly a construction, since racial traits are not reducible, i.e., genetic, organization” (108).  He might have chosen better language in this sentence such as “sex” instead of “gender.”  Gender is constructed within or without the individual needing particular “hardware.”  I found his usage here unusual because he later quotes Sandy Stone, who I believe would have also taken issue with this because other work that I have read by her (e.g., “The Empire Strikes Back:  A Posttranssexual Manifesto”).

    —————–

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Deborah Grayson

    LCC 3306

    October 24, 2005

    Study Guide for “Digitizing the Racialized Body or The Politics of Universal Address”

    “I would suggest that Piper’s concrete engagement with technology as a site of de-differentiation and universality must itself be understood in the dual mode of confrontation and invitation.  The result is a significant complixification:  not only is the address to black subjects nuanced in a way that routes self-perception through perception by the Other–that is, through the surveillant and/or consumerist gaze, but the address is opened in an unprecedented way to non-black, non-minoritarian, that is, white subjects” (116).

    “Caught Like a Nigger in Cyberspace compelled me to undergo a kind of becoming-other, a loosening of the grip of the identity markings on my embodiment, a felt recognition of  the fluidity–the bodily excess–underlying them.  At this moment, I confronted myself as an affective subject, a subject defined by my own excess over any of my actual states” (123).

    “Through the affective confusion it brokers, Relocating the Remains offers the catalyst for a radical reconfiguration of the self beyond identity, a reconfiguration as a self rooted in the potentiality of the body, as a self essentially ‘out of phase’ with itself” (124).

    Hansen, Mark B. N..  “Digitizing the Racialized Body or The Politics of Universal Address.”        SubStance.  33:2 (2004):  107-133.

    Main Points:

    Online “passing” serves as a mechanism for reinforcing certain stereotypes and identities.

    The Internet and the new media can be utilized “to move beyond interpellation” because of the effectiveness of interactive media to convey an affect held by the artist or by a group of people.

    Keith Piper’s Relocating the Remains is a powerful example of a work to use excessive affect in bringing about a better understanding, a glimpse of being, and an emotive response in “non-black, non-minoritarian, that is, white subjects” (116).

    Questions:

    Have you had an experience online where you chatted with someone online, but after you met the person in real life, the person did not match your preconceived image of him/her?

    Have you been to an interactive art exhibit or visited a website that actively conveyed an affect of a person or a group of people represented in the work?

    Do you think that the affect of experience of one group of people can be conveyed in the work by a person not of or not considered a part of that group?  (e.g., Postcolonial critiques of elite writers who are disconnected from their country of origin.  For example, Salman Rushdie has written about the country of his birth, but his life is far removed from someone that actually lived their whole life in India.)

    Annotated Bibliography:

    Everett, Anna.  “The Revolution with Be Digitized:  Afrocentricity and the Digital Public      Sphere.”  Social Text.  20:2 (Summer 2002):  125-146.

    Anna Everett explores the “African diaspora’s” early access to computers and the Internet.  She also maps the shift of the African American press to the Internet.

    Kolko, Beth E., Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman, eds.  Race in Cyberspace.  New York:       Routledge, 2000.

    This collection of papers addresses many aspects of race in ‘cyberspace’ (e.g., online, in games, and other digital forms).  Jennifer González’s “The Appended Subject:  Race and Identity as Digital Assemblage” is one work in this book that relates to the issues that Hansen addresses.  González looks at websites that present the body through racialized appendages.

    Nakamura, Lisa.  “Race In/For Cyberspace:  Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the     Internet.”  1999.  20 October 2005

    <http://www.humanities.uci.edu/mposter/syllabi/readings/nakamura.html&gt;.

    Nakamura addresses issues of performing identities online such as in chat spaces like LambdaMOO.  She calls the theatricality of assuming and performing as an online identity, “identity tourism,” which is akin to Orientalist appropriations of the Other.

    Related Works:

    Piper, Keith.  Relocating the Remains.  1997.  22 October 2005 <http://www.iniva.org/piper/&gt;.

    Porter, David. ed.  Internet Culture.  New York:  Routledge, 1997.

    Poster, Mark.  What’s the Matter With the Internet?  Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota           Press, 2001.

    Poster, Mark and Stanley Aronowitz.  The Information Subject.  Amsterdam:  G+B Arts      International, 2001.

  • Recovered Writing: Undergraduate Age of Scientific Discovery, More’s Utopia and Machiavelli’s The Prince Essay, April 23, 2002

    This is the twenty-fourth post in a series that I call, “Recovered Writing.” I am going through my personal archive of undergraduate and graduate school writing, recovering those essays I consider interesting but that I am unlikely to revise for traditional publication, and posting those essays as-is on my blog in the hope of engaging others with these ideas that played a formative role in my development as a scholar and teacher. Because this and the other essays in the Recovered Writing series are posted as-is and edited only for web-readability, I hope that readers will accept them for what they are–undergraduate and graduate school essays conveying varying degrees of argumentation, rigor, idea development, and research. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of these essays languishing in a digital tomb, so I offer them here to excite your curiosity and encourage your conversation.

    I wrote this essay for Professor Robert Wood’s LCC 2104 Age of Scientific Discovery class at Georgia Tech. This was shortly after I was readmitted to the program after working in IT for several years. My citations are sloppy and incomplete and the writing is evidence of my writing’s early stages and on-going development. This is the third of three essays from Professor Wood’s class.

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Robert Wood

    LCC 2104 Age of Discovery

    April 23, 2002

    Essay 3

    The Utopians in Sir Thomas More’s Utopia handle foreign relations and implements of war in ways that can be critiqued in terms of Niccolo Machavelli’s The Prince. Three issues that can be examined are those involving foreign relations, the act of war, and the resolutions at the end of war.

    One element which Machavelli deals with that shows up in More’s Utopia had to do with foreign relations. This included treaties and the word of a country’s leader. The Utopians have this view of treaties with other kingdoms and countries:

    While other nations are constantly making treaties, breaking them, and renewing them, the Utopians never make any treaties at all. If nature, they say, doesn’t bind man adequately to his fellow man, will an alliance do so? If a man scorns nature herself, is there any reason to think he will care about mere words? They are confirmed in this view by the fact that in that part of the world, treaties and alliances between kings are not generally observed with much good faith (More 64).

    The Utopians feel that one’s word is what binds them. Without holding that a man’s word is something to believe, then what more will writing on a paper do to hold a man to his word? This principle is born of relations outside Utopia. Each man that is a Utopian can believe and hold true to the word of another Utopian. But in their dealings with neighboring countries and kingdoms they have found that treaties are not worth the paper that they are written on. Machiavelli responds to this issue thus:

    Everyone realizes how praiseworthy it is for a prince to honour his word and to be straightforward rather than crafty in his dealings; none the less contemporary experience shows that princes who have achieved great things have been those who have given their word lightly, who have known how to trick men with their cunning, and who in the end, have overcome those abiding by honest principles (Machiavelli 56).

    The author of The Prince holds that he also realizes that men do not always honor their word, but that a ruler who wishes to “[achieve] great things” must be willing to “[give] their word lightly” and “[know] how to trick men with their cunning.” He goes on to write:

    He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout. An indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how (Machiavelli 57).

    Machiavelli might concede that in a perfect world, the way of the Utopians, that you can believe the word of another, but Machiavelli’s world is far from perfect. He has seen and read about how people behave and he brought this accumulated knowledge together in writing The Prince. Essentially the world is a dark place where you either have to stab the other fellow in the back, or he might just try to stab you in the back. Machiavelli suggests that a ruler be good and just, but he must also be ready to play the other side of the coin. If he is not prepared to do so, then he might not be a ruler for very long.

    The Utopians go to war only on certain precepts. More writes:

    They go to war only for good reasons; among these are the protection of their own land, the protection of their friends from an invading army, and the liberation of an oppressed people from tyranny and servitude. Out of human sympathy, they not only protect their friends from present danger, but avenge previous injuries; they do this, however, only if they themselves have previously been consulted, have approved the cause, and have demanded restitution in vain. Then and only then they think themselves free to declare war. They take this final step not only when their friends have been plundered, but also when their friends’ merchants have been subjected to extortion in another country, either through laws unfair in themselves or through the perversion of good laws (More 66).

    Utopia protects it’s own interests and the interests of its allies. Also it acts as a sort of regional police force to make sure that kingdoms around it are subjected to “tyranny and servitude.” For the most part the Utopians do try to avoid battles, particularly with their own people serving as soldiers. First, they will act to place a high bounty on the leaders of the opposing kingdom. If this does not work, they then try to break the enemy’s ranks or create internal turmoil among the nobility of the opposing kingdom. And as a final resort they will engage in battle. First with hired mercenaries, and then if that does not work, with their own citizens. More notes, “both men and women alike carry on vigorous military training, so they will be fit to fight should the need arise” (More 66). The Utopian’s goal in war is:

    …to secure what would have prevented the declaration of war, if the enemy had conceded it before hand. Or if they cannot get that, they try to take such bitter revenge on those who have injured them that they will be afraid ever to do it again. These are their chief concerns, which they go after energetically, yet in such a way as to avoid danger, rather than to win fame and glory (More 67).

    In order to prevent future conflict they enact a very strict punishment on their enemies if their goals were not met initially. For being a peaceful people, they are pragmatic in their waging of war. Their methods are practical for their purposes and the methods also serve to defeat an enemy completely if their goals are not met immediately. Machiavelli has these things to say in regards to warfare:

    A prince also wins prestige for being a true friend or a true enemy, that is, for revealing himself without any reservation in favour of one side against another. This policy is always more advantageous than neutrality. For instance, if the powers neigbouring on you come to blows, either they are such that, if one of them conquers, you will be in danger, or they are not. In either case it will always be to your advantage to declare yourself and to wage a vigorous war; because in the first case, if you do not declare yourself you will always be at the mercy of the conqueror, much to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one who has been beaten, and you will have no justification nor any way to obtain protection or refuge. The conqueror does not want doubtful friends who do not help him when he is in difficulties; the loser repudiates you because you were unwilling to go, arms in hand, and throw in your lot with him (Machiavelli 72-73).

    Machiavelli writes The Prince as a sort of guide book on how to rule and achieve as a ruler during his time. That being said, some of his remarks on warfare and engagement deal with a ruler fighting not only for a cause or for gains for his people, but also for gaining prestige for the ruler. More’s Utopians do not fight for this purpose, but to act for the success of their own kingdom as well as those kingdoms that are their friends or neighbors who might be subjected to tyrannical rule. Machiavelli does hold that one should not remain neutral during conflict. More holds that the Utopians are much of this same stock. Machiavelli applies here to the Utopians because of underlying reasons why the Utopians would engage their enemies. Why protect a neighboring kingdom’s subjects who have been repressed by a tyrannical leader? That tyrannical leader might prove to be a person wanting more lands and power which would eventually endanger Utopian interests abroad as well as on their home land. For them it is better to engage the menace now instead of waiting until the problem is more pronounced. Also, by the Utopians throwing in their lot with friends or repressed peoples, they clearly show who they are allied with. As Machiavelli writes it is better to state who you are with and reap the outcome instead of being neutral and being at the possible mercy of the winner of the war. In regards to mercenary soldiers Machiavelli has this to say:

    I want to show more clearly what unhappy results follow the use of mercenaries. Mercenary commanders are either skilled in warfare or they are not: if they are, you cannot trust them, because they are anxious to advance their own greatness, either by coercing you, their employer, or by coercing others against your own wishes. If, however, the commander is lacking in prowess, in the normal way he brings about your ruin. If anyone argues that this is true of any other armed force, mercenary or not, I reply that armed forces must be under the control of either a prince or a republic: a prince should assume personal command and captain his troops himself; a republic must appoint its own citizens, and when a commander so appointed turns out incompetent, should change him, and if he is competent, it should limit his authority by statute. Experience has shown that only princes and armed republics achieve solid success, and that mercenaries bring nothing but loss; and a republic which has its own citizen army is far less likely to be subjugated by one of its own citizens than a republic whose forces are not its own (Machiavelli 40).

    More’s Utopians use mercenaries to help fight their battles so as to spare their own people. Also it should be noted that the Utopians will not let mercenaries stay on their island at any time. “Because the Utopians give higher pay than anyone else, [the mercenaries] are ready to serve them against any enemy whatever” (More 69). To lead their army of mercenaries and indigenous peoples for whom they are fighting, “Last they add their own citizens, including some man of known bravery to command the entire army” (More 69). The Utopians lead their mercenary armies as Machiavelli suggests. But More does not note the issues with mercenary forces that Machavelli notes in saying, “Experience has shown that only princes and armed republics achieve solid success, and that mercenaries bring nothing but loss” (Machiavelli 40). The reasons for this is that a mercenary army, lead by a mercenary commander or by a commander for whom they represent, but if they win a territory or a war, what stops the mercenaries from deciding to lay claim to their winnings and not allow the kingdom they represent handle the subsequent winnings? Dealing with mercenaries is a difficult issue which More gives a naive treatment of according to Machavelli’s approach and counsel.

    After the end of a war, there must be concessions and payment in some form made to the winner. In the conclusion of war, the Utopians deal with their enemy in this manner:

    When the Utopians make a truce with the enemy, they observe it religiously, and will not break it even if provoked. They do not ravage the enemy’s territory or burn his crops; indeed, so far as possible, they avoid any trampling of the crops by men or horses, thinking they may need the grain later on…When cities are surrendered to them, they keep them intact; even when they have stormed a place, they do not plunder it, but put to death the men who prevented surrender, enslave the other defenders, and do no harm to the civilians. If they find any of the inhabitants who recommended surrender, they give them a share in the property of the condemned, and present their auxiliaries with the rest, for the Utopians themselves never take any booty.
    After a war is ended, they collect the cost of it, not from the allies for whose sake they undertook it, but from the conquered. They take as indemnity not only money which they set aside to finance future wars, but also landed estates from which they may enjoy forever a generous annual income…As managers of these estates, they send abroad some of their own citizens, with the title of Financial Factors…
    If any foreign prince takes up arms and prepares to invade their land, they immediately attack him in full force outside their own borders (More 72).

    The Utopians do not exercise rule over those defeated. They take do a sort of redistribution of land to those who recommend surrender to the Utopians. Crops and fields are not destroyed because they might be considered useful later to the Utopians. Also, they take lands which they can demand an income for. These estates are managed by Utopian citizens who are dispatched there. Of note, they hold true to their truces with enemies, but if a foreign state decides to attack or prepare to attack Utopia, then the Utopians will attack that country with full force. Machiavelli sets out several ways of dealing with conquered lands. One of these meets closely to the way that the Utopians handle the spoils of war. He writes:

    When states newly acquired as I said have been accustomed to living freely under their own laws, there are three ways to hold them securely: first, by devastating them; next, by going and living there in person; thirdly, by letting them keep their own laws, exacting tribute, and setting up an oligarchy which will keep the state friendly to you. In the last case, the government will know that it cannot endure without the friendship and power of the prince who created it, and so it has to exert itself to maintain his authority. A city used to freedom can be more easily ruled through its own citizens, provided you do not wish to destroy it, than in any other way (Machiavelli 16).

    The Utopians are close to the third case that Machavelli states in The Prince. However, More does not spell out that the Utopians setup a friendly government in place of an unfriendly one. He does write, “they do not plunder it, but put to death the men who prevented surrender, enslave the other defenders, and do no harm to the civilians” (More 72). Perhaps their truces account for this, or they let the civilians form a new government. If this is the case, then Machavelli does go on to say that “A city used to freedom can be more easily ruled through its own citizens, provided you do not wish to destroy it, than in any other way” (Machiavelli 16).

    The principles of Machiavelli’s The Prince apply to More’s Utopia. On some things the two do not agree completely, but this is not surprising since Machiavelli dealt with his observations and reading of the real world, while More’s work was of a fantasy land that wasn’t solidly established in the real world. The Utopians appear to be a composite of a country of almost perfect persons who hold to their word and act according to that word. Reality does not allow for this composite of a person to exist. Machavelli shows that there must be a sort of twin personality in dealing with foreign relations. Also, Machavelli’s approach to war and dealing with war’s aftermath is more practical than what the Utopians do. It seems the Utopians actions and works are like blocks of Lego that snap to form a whole, while Machavelli’s cases and alternatives are more like clay kneaded and sculpted to form a more organic whole.

     

    Works Cited

    Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Trans. George Bull. New York, New York:

    Penguin Books, 1999.

     

    More, Sir Thomas. Utopia. Trans. Robert M. Adams. New York, New York:

    W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1992.

     

  • Recovered Writing: Undergraduate Age of Scientific Discovery, Copernicus and Galileo Essay, March 19, 2002

    This is the twenty-third post in a series that I call, “Recovered Writing.” I am going through my personal archive of undergraduate and graduate school writing, recovering those essays I consider interesting but that I am unlikely to revise for traditional publication, and posting those essays as-is on my blog in the hope of engaging others with these ideas that played a formative role in my development as a scholar and teacher. Because this and the other essays in the Recovered Writing series are posted as-is and edited only for web-readability, I hope that readers will accept them for what they are–undergraduate and graduate school essays conveying varying degrees of argumentation, rigor, idea development, and research. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of these essays languishing in a digital tomb, so I offer them here to excite your curiosity and encourage your conversation.

    I wrote this essay for Professor Robert Wood’s LCC 2104 Age of Scientific Discovery class at Georgia Tech. This was shortly after I was readmitted to the program after working in IT for several years. My citations are sloppy and incomplete and the writing is evidence of my writing’s early stages and on-going development. This is the second of three essays from Professor Wood’s class.

    Jason W. Ellis

    Professor Robert Wood

    LCC 2104 Age of Discovery

    March 19, 2002

    Essay 2

    Copernicus and Galileo both had unique scientific methodologies that they applied to their work in astronomy. Copernicus shows a reliance on that of the past and he builds on the work of others. He is not merely making commentary, but transposing his own findings on that which came before. Galileo takes this a step further by understanding what has been said and relying on his observational work to be the interpretation of the heavens. He also extends his work into the world through letters and publishings to open discourse between himself and others. Thus creating a dynamic to possibly find faults in his findings or show fault in the findings of others.

    The beginning of the revolution concerning understanding how the planets of our solar system are arranged started with the work of Copernicus with the work De revolutionibus. Copernicus conducts his observations and mathematical deductions on the precept in Hallyn that, “as the beneficiary for whom the world was made, man can attain true knowledge. In place of a universe whose beauty and rationality escape us, and which thereby calls us to humility, Copernicus substitutes a cosmos for which man is the final purpose and whose true plane he can reconstruct.” Additionally, Hallyn writes, “Copernicus was not content to admire an inaccessible wisdom “from afar”; he believed that science must permit man to penetrate the arcana of the divine plan and must be willing to submit to complete reform if necessary to achieve this anagogical goal.” Copernicus elevates the status of man and astronomer to one who is able to spy the truth in nature through observation and deductions based on those observations.

    Work done by predecessors and particularly, the ancients, Copernicus valued a great deal. He viewed astronomy as building on itself with the work done by those who came before. In Hallyn, there is this passage and quote of Copernicus regarding acknowledging the prior works of others.

    Copernicus takes care, moreover, to emphasize that the very theory he is proposing is based on an ancient hypothesis concerning the nature of the universe:

    I undertook the task of rereading the works of all the philosophers which I could obtain to learn whether anyone had every proposed other motions of the universe’s spheres than those expounded by the teachers of astronomy in the schools. And in fact first I found in Cicero that Nicetas supposed the earth to move. Later I also discovered in Plutarch that certain others were of this opinion…Therefore, having obtained the opportunity from these sources, I too bean to consider the mobility of the earth. And even though the idea seemed absurd, nevertheless I knew that others before me had been granted the freedom to imagine any circles whatever for the purpose of explaining the heavenly phenomena. Hence I thought that I too would be readily permitted to ascertain whether explanations sounder than those of my predecessors could be found for the revolution of the celestial spheres on the assumption of some motion of the earth.

    Hallyn writes, “the importance of this passage lies not only in the way it recalls certain precursors, but also in the weight it ascribes to a particular form of renovatio based on the liberty to think, which may in turn lead to innovatio.” Copernicus is learning about ideas that surfaced in the past. Some of those ideas might not have been popular or they might not have had the ability to prove them properly at that time. Now he decides to take some of these ideas and try them on his own. He makes them his hypotheses which he will test with observation and he will apply his knowledge of mathematics to what he finds. He understands that the technology and mathematics of his time in regard to astronomy is greater than that which they had in previous times. This affords him a certain ability to learn new truths and a liberty to investigate further than those before him. Thus the “renovatio,” the renovation of ideas leads to “innovatio,” innovation born of those ideas.

    His work in De revolutionibus is analogous to his search for truth. It is a transformation of old ideas into the next level. He is not merely commenting on previous work, but he is taking what he has learned from others, particularly, Ptolemy, and from his mathematical treatments on that work to develop the next plateau of understanding. Debus writes, “in short, the Ptolemaic system was recast.” The sun was placed at the mathematical center of the universe. This was surrounded by the planets, each set in their crystalline spheres. Outside this was the sphere of fixed stars. The Copernican system retained a good deal of complexity found in the Ptolemaic system, but he had simplified some things. Copernicus had eliminated equant circles and epicycles that explained retrograde motion were almost completely resolved (if he had accepted elipical orbits this would have been fully resolved). Additionally his system allowed for relative distances of the planets from the sun to be calculated using trigonometry.

    It cannot be too lightly stressed that Copernicus has a great respect and reliance on Ptolemy. Copernicus even notes concern regarding his belief in the basis of the Ptolemic system when he says in Hallyn, “not to disorient the diligent reader by straying too far from Ptolemy.” He takes Ptolemy’s work, internalizes it and then rebuilds it with the additional information and knowledge that he has. For Copernicus astronomy is an interpretive and transformative process. It is interpretive because new ways of explaining data may be found. it is transformative because an earlier concept or work is elaborated on and changed into a new system based on the old.

    The methodology used by Galileo is slightly different than that used by Copernicus. Galileo relies on a system closer to that which we see today in the sciences. The telescope is better refined and it’s power much better than that used by Copernicus. Thus Galileo uses this for more accurate observations. Also he relies on diligent and regular observational data. One cannot observe occasionally and expect to get data that show trends or behavior over time accurately. Building on this concept he puts forth the idea that if someone follows his procedures for observation, using a similar apparatus, the observation can be reproducible from different locations. This means someone in Rome can make the same observation of sun spots that someone in Florence can make.

    Standards in observation were something he adherently held to in order to build data that can be accurately interpreted and used by different persons. In his observations on sunspots Galileo notes how he makes these observations so that they are accurate. On pages 115-116 of Drake, Galileo notes the method he uses that was developed by his pupil Benedetto Castelli. His description is very precise and descriptive. If someone wanted to begin observing sunspots they could easily use this method that Galileo describes to do so.

    The structure of the “Letters on Sunspots” in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo also serve to show the desire Galileo had for discourse in the science of astronomy. He believed that a well reasoned argument with supporting evidence should sway any dissenting voice to the truth of his argument. The “Letters on Sunspots” show him answering, by way of letter, questions and counter-arguments from his dissenters. He is exact in explaining his point of view and he follows up by pointing out how the argument from a dissenter might be mistaken or incorrect. During this time the Aristotelians still were a dominant force in the academia. An important point that Galileo makes is that even Aristotle would arrive at similar conclusions as himself if he had had the apparatus that was available during Galileo’s time.

    Galileo differs from Copernicus in that instead of relying and giving a great deal of credit to the work done before him, he relies much more heavily on the accumulation of observational data and of reasoning through that data. Through Galileo’s work he was able to prove that the Copernican system was essentially true.

    One of the most important distinctions that Galileo presses is that of naming. Prior to and during Galileo’s time, many astronomers would refer to objects or lights in the heavens as “stars.” Planets, supernovae, comets, and everything else were grouped together in this manner and referred to as “stars.” When you are attempting to explain something and how it is different from something else, nomenclature is very important. In his work, “The Starry Messenger,” Galileo goes to great lengths to describe and illustrate the differences between things in the heavens. This is necessary for him to describe the moons of Jupiter, or as he called them, the Medicean planets. In his illustrations on pages 52-65 of Drake, he not only shows regular depictions of the location of the Medicean planets, but also their relative size or brightness. Through the course of the illustrations one can see the nature of rotation they make around Jupiter.

    Galileo and Copernicus each have a particular way about which they discovered truth about the way in which the solar system operates. Copernicus built on the knowledge of others augmenting and modifying that with his own intuition, observation, and mathematical ability. Galileo took this a step farther by incorporating a more detached view of the heavens by relying on observational data to prove his points. The methods of Galileo show a strong resemblance to that of scientific observation today: observation, deduction, reporting, peer review and discussion.

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    Debus, Allen G. Man and Nature in the Renaissance. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

     

    Drake, Stillman, ed. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Trans. Stillman Drake. New York, New York: Anchor Books, 1957.

     

    Hallyn, Fernand. The Poetic Structure of the World: Copernicus and Kepler. Trans. Donald M. Leslie. New York, New York: Zone Books, 1987.